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Od paravojaške organizacije do politične stranke: primer Sinn Fein na Irskem 1981-
2007 
Obstaja veliko dejavnikov, ki pojasnjujejo, kako se je organizacija Sinn Fein v obdobju 1981-
2017 preoblikovala iz manjšega političnega krila paravojaške organizacije v uspešno 
politično stranko. Eden od njih je bil vedno večji interes stranke za sodelovanje v volilni 
politiki in odpovedovanje nasilnim metodam za dosego njenih ciljev. Ta proces se je začel 
med gladovno stavko irskih republikanskih zapornikov, ko so potekale tudi nadomestne 
volitve na katerih je zmagal Bobby Sands, vodja zapornikov, ki so gladovno stavkali. 
Publiciteta, ki je spremljala gladovno stavko, tej je sledila zmaga na nadomestnih volitvah, 
skupaj s smrtjo Bobbyja Sandsa in devetih njegovih tovarišev, je Sinn Fein in Irsko 
republikansko gibanje preusmerila k uporabi legalnih načinov doseganja zastavljenih ciljev in 
ne več zgolj nasilnih poti za dosego ciljev.  Stranka se je počasi oddaljila od uporabe nasilnih 
sredstev ter se vedno bolj vključevala v volilno politiko. Od leta 1986, ko je svojim članom 
dovolila udeležbo v delovanju parlamenta Republike Irske, prve prekinitve sovražnosti leta 
1994 in končne leta 1997, pa vse do leta 1998, ko je aktivno sodelovala v pogajanjih in 
zaključku t.i. Belfastskega sporazuma. Takrat so se v Sinn Fein strinjali, da bodo aktivno 
sodelovali v dogovoru o delitvi oblasti z Britanskimi unionisti na Severnem Irskem. Leta 
2005 se je končala njihova oborožena kampanja in leta 2007 so vstopili v vlado z 
Demokratično unionistično stranko, njihovimi dolgoletnimi sovražniki.   
Ključne besede: volilna politika, preoblikovanje, evolucija, stranka, Irska. 
From paramilitary organisation to a political party: the case of Sinn Fein in Ireland 
1981-2007 
There were many factors that dictated how Sinn Fein transformed themselves from being the 
minor political wing of a paramilitary organisation to being a successful political party 
between 1981 and 2007. One of them was the party’s increasing interest in electoral politics 
and contesting elections in Ireland rather than only using violent methods to achieve their 
goals. They began this during a hunger strike of Irish republican prisoners when a by-election 
was held, a by-election won by the leader of the prisoners on hunger strike, Bobby Sands. 
The publicity surrounding the hunger strike and subsequent election victory, along with the 
death of Bobby Sands and nine of his comrades during the hunger strike, led to Sinn Fein and 
the Irish Republican Movement in general taking more of an interest in achieving their goals 
through legal means rather than purely through violence. They slowly moved away from 
using violence to becoming more and more involved in politics, by voting to allow their 
members sit in the Republic of Ireland parliament in 1986, to the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 
and final one in 1997, to taking an active part in the negotiations and the final settlement of 
the Belfast Agreement in 1998 where they agreed to participate in a power-sharing agreement 
with British unionist in Northern Ireland, to the end of their armed campaign in 2005 and 
their entry into a power-sharing government along with their former enemies the Democratic 
Unionist Party in 2007.  
Key words: electoral politics, transformation, evolution, party, Ireland. 
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1 Introduction 
Throughout modern history, there have been countless examples of organisations which over 
a period of time, transformed themselves from being paramilitary organisations to political 
parties, and many of these organisations have even become the governments of many 
countries e.g , the Whigs in 17th  and 18th century Britain,  the Irish Parliamentary Party under 
the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell, the Communist Party of Cuba under Fidel Castro, 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea under Pol Pot, the Communist Party of Russia under 
Vladimir Lenin and the Nazi Party of Germany under Adolf Hitler.  These examples are of 
political movements in what were or became undemocratic countries, but such development 
can emerge also in democratic countries. 
More generally, this thesis will show and use examples of how different political 
organisations have evolved from using purely violence and other alternative methods without 
contesting elections to achieve their goals, to using elections to increase their popularity and 
to achieve their goals through electoral success and using legitimate and lawful means. I will 
undertake a case study of the Irish political party Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland as an example of a political organisation who for many years supported 
and advocated for the use of violence to achieve their political goals, before adopting a 
peaceful strategy through contesting elections without using violence, and using electoral 
politics to try and achieve their goals. In the literature, many reasons can be found to explain 
why such a transformation of political organisations can occur e.g, a forced change in tactics 
due to a change in social, economic and political conditions in a country, or failure of a 
certain type of tactic such as using violence to achieve political goals. I expect that the case of 
Sinn Fein will demonstrate how an organisation can be transformed from within by the main 
actors inside the organisation, by persuading the majority of the movement over many years 
that they should slowly step away from using violent methods to achieve their goals, to using 
only peaceful methods and electoral politics to increase their popularity and try and achieve 
their goals without using the methods which they had espoused for many years previously. 
Throughout this paper, I will be using many books and sources of information which deal 
with the evolution of political parties and the changes in conditions in different countries 
which may have led to a change of tactics in how they went about achieving their goals. 
These sources will include works by prominent scholars, and they are works which deal with 
the evolution of different political movements and the reasons for the change of tactics in 
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order to increase their support and gain more political power. For the case study itself dealing 
with the evolution of Sinn Fein, I will use prominent scholars with many published works and 
a great knowledge of the political situation in Ireland. I will also use video footage and 
documentaries about the period in question, such as the documentary Hunger which was first 
broadcast on Irish television 25 years after the 1981 hunger strikes took place, and footage 
from Sinn Fein conventions such as the one in 1986 where the party decided to take part in 
the Irish parliament for the first time in 65 years. Footage such as this is invaluable for my 
MA thesis, as they include interviews with people who played large roles in what was taking 
place in Irish politics at the time, as well as many of those who were and still do play key 
roles in the Irish republican movement. 
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2 Theoretical part and literature review of the Development of political parties and evolution 
of political organisations and movements into mainstream political parties 
 
There have been many works written by various authors in relation to political movements 
which have changed and reinvented themselves in order to try and become a mainstream 
political party. I will discuss this in detail throughout this section, by explaining the concept 
of a political party, how political parties are classified and the different types of members and 
activists within political parties. 
Political parties are defined as being a ‘collection of individuals’ with the same views on 
opinions on political matters (Aldrich, 1995, p.31). The first model of what we now know as 
political parties originated in late 17th century Britain as a result of the Exclusion Crisis and 
the Glorious Revolution (Jones, 1985, p.4) The two main political factions in Britain born out 
of this crisis were the Whigs and the Tories, the Whigs supporting Protestant constitutional 
monarchy like that led by William of Orange against absolute rule while the Tories favoured 
a more old fashioned type of leadership like the Stuarts who ruled Britain for most of the 17th 
century, with the Tories supporting the Jacobites whilst the Whigs supported the Hanoverian 
succession to the British monarchy in 1715, which then enabled them to remain in power in 
Britain for much of the 18th century. 
The French Revolution was also another important moment in the history of political parties. 
It was during this that the terms we now know as left-wing and right-wing politics originated 
from, those who sat to the right of the chairman of the National Assembly supported the King 
of France and his traditional style of rule, those who opposed him and wanted to overthrow 
him sat to his left. Many different political factions and movements came about as a result of 
the chaos caused by the French Revolution. Some of the more notable ones included the 
Jacobins, which in itself included other political factions like the Girondins and the 
Mountain. The Mountain faction with the Jacobins included Maximilian Robespierre, who 
was one of the main instigators behind the infamous Reign of Terror during the French 
Revolution which led to thousands of people suspected of being a threat to the newly formed 
republic in France, being executed (Linton, 2006)The Directory which ruled France after the 
death of Robespierre was also divided between the Jacobin faction and those opposed to it 
until the coup d’etat orchestrated by Napoleon in 1799 which led to him becoming a dictator 
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and bringing to an end the power held by the newly created political factions in France for the 
time being. 
The newly created United States of America was another place where political parties 
became an important feature of the nation’s political system shortly after the state was 
created. As early as the late 18th century, American politics was already becoming polarised 
between 2 political factions, at that time they were the Federalist Party and the Democratic-
Republican Party. After a period of consensus where both factions put their differences aside 
in the early 19th century, a split occurred again and the 2 main factions were the Democrats 
led by President Andrew Jackson and the Whig party led by Henry Clay (Boyer, 2009, 
p.215). By the 1850s, the two parties had become the most popular and powerful in America 
with the Whigs having become the Republican party, and to this day their status as the two 
dominant political parties in the Unites States has remained unchanged and relatively 
unchallenged as well. 
Another important example of the evolution of political parties was the Irish Parliamentary 
Party in the late 19th century. Under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell, the party 
created what became known as a party whip system, whereby the members of a political 
party sitting in parliament would all vote the same way on issues and remain loyal to the 
party (O’Farrell, 2008, p.406). This was deemed necessary for the Irish Party at the time, as 
their main concern was trying to persuade the British parliament to grant them their wish of 
an Irish parliament which had been abolished in 1801, leading to all Irish parliamentary 
business taking place in England rather than in Ireland. But due to the refusal of the 
aristocratic House of Lords to give Ireland ‘Home Rule’, Parnell ultimately failed in his quest 
to get self-government for Ireland. But the party whip system which he installed in the Irish 
Party, where party members would always agree with the party stance or risk being excluded 
from the party, became popular in other political movements, and has now become 
commonplace among political parties across the world (Lyons, 1996, p.54). 
The writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels which were published in the middle of the 
19th century led to the creation of many political parties of a socialist nature. The goal of 
many of these parties was to create a socialist state with the aim of creating a communist 
utopia like what Marx and Engels envisaged in their writings, with other parties taking a 
more social democratic stance which was not as radical as Marxism and which conformed to 
a more moderate and peaceful approach to gaining political power (Busky, 2000, p.8). Many 
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of the political parties with a Marxist influence were determined to gain power by any means 
necessary including using violence. But Marxist organisations did not make an impact in 
Europe until the Russian Revolutions of 1917, where the Russian Marxist theoretician 
Vladimir Lenin led a small number of revolutionaries to take over the Winter Palace in St 
Petersburg, which led to the communists taking over control of Russia and staying in power 
for nearly 75 years. This event came about after the political turmoil earlier that year which 
resulted in the abdication of the Tsar of Russia and the unstable Provisional Government and 
chaos which continued up until the communist take over later in 1917. For many years before 
he came to power in Russia, Lenin had been putting forward his own variant of Marxism, 
which involved a small number of devoted revolutionaries overthrowing the government and 
taking power with the intent of creating a socialist society (Ryan, 2012, p.19). Lenin 
supported the view of Marx and Engels that violence was needed in order to overthrow the 
capitalist state, and the October Revolution in Russia in 1917 inspired many others to achieve 
something similar in their home countries throughout the 20th century, with the likes of Mao 
ze-Dong, Fidel Castro, Pol Pot, Kim il-Sung and Ho Chi Minh, as well as many communist 
leaders in post-war Eastern Europe who were helped by the Russians in the late 1940s to 
come to power, being successful in overthrowing the ruling governments and implementing 
their socialist policies which were predominantly inspired by the writings of Marx, Engels 
and Lenin. 
This Marxist-Leninist theory of using violence to gain political power and even to become 
the ruling political force in a country was also part of the political strategy of the IRA for 
many years. As late as 1977, the IRA had a training manual allegedly known as the Green 
Book which detailed its military and political strategy as well as the tactics they wished to use 
in order to cause British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and create a 32 county Irish 
Republic based on the principles of the 1916 Proclamation (Dillon, 2016, p.447).  As the IRA 
were not focusing on increasing their electoral support at that time, the book mainly focuses 
on military aspects, but it does show the political ideology of the IRA at the time as well, 
declaring their goal of an ‘Irish socialist state’ which would under an IRA ideology would 
‘enact a policy aimed at eradicating the social imperialism’ of the day and returning the 
‘ownership of Ireland to the people of Ireland’, as well as an anti-imperialist state which 
would not take sides with any of the ‘imperialistic military and economic power blocs 
throughout the world’ (Coogan, 1987, pp.550-1). As we will see in my case study, the IRA’s 
political wing Sinn Fein were to use many of these ideals when they began contesting 
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elections and still do so to this day, although the party ideals have become more moderate the 
more the party has become a mainstream political party. 
In his book titled ‘Political Parties: Organisation and Power’, the prominent academic Angelo 
Panebianco states his view that there are two types of party members, believers and 
careerists. Believers are party members who according to Panebianco, are those who are 
devoted to the party goals and strongly protests if the party attempts to deviate from their 
original goals, while careerists are party members who are more interested in selective 
interests (Panebianco, 1988, p.27). He also says that believers play a central role in an 
organisation where the ideology of the party is one of the party’s most crucial aspects, but it 
could also be said that the careerists are the ones who are the more capable of making an 
unpopular and unattractive political party to the majority of people, an attractive party which 
can increase its voter base (Panebianco, 1988, p.264). In my case study, we will see the 
divide between believers and careerists which came to light in Sinn Fein in 1986 when the 
party split due to the majority deciding to recognise the Irish parliament. Those who 
Panebianco would describe as believers left Sinn Fein to form Republican Sinn Fein with the 
Continuity IRA as its military wing, a movement which although stayed true to the 
Provisional IRA’s political and military ideology,  never gained popularity, probably to its 
belief in not contesting national elections in Ireland as well as the fact that most of the 
Provisionals stayed loyal to the party leader Gerry Adams, while those who Panebianco 
would probably describe as careerists stayed in Sinn Fein, and despite an initial lack of 
success, the party would eventual increase its electoral support in the years afterwards, 
particularly when they stopped using violence as a method of trying to achieve their goals. 
In his book ‘Party Transformations in European Democracies’, Andre Krouwel discusses 
how party ideologies can be preserved and insulated from other ideologies by creating 
organisations, cultural activities and social outlets where people of the same political 
ideology and social class can socialise together, leading to an increased bond and loyalty 
between party members (Krouwel, 2012, p.17). Duverger also discussed this in detail many 
years ago when he described what he saw as the difference between political parties which 
were branch based, and parties which he described as being ‘cell-based devotee’ parties, 
which were far more totalitarian in their ideology and organisation (Duverger, 1954, pp.63-
71). There are also mass parties according to Gunther and Diamond which can be very 
nationalistic in their ideology and are proto-hegemonic in their ideology and can be more of a 
militia type organisation (Gunther and Diamond, 2001, pp.180-183). All of these examples of 
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the different types of political parties just used above could be used to describe Sinn Fein in 
the latter part of the 20th century, which I will discuss in more detail when I will be 
comparing and contrasting the different types and models of political parties and how they 
may be applicable to the case of Sinn Fein later on in my thesis. 
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3 Political movements and change of their methods in order to gain political power and 
achieve their goals 
Transformation of political organisations into electoral political parties 
There are many reasons as to why I believe the case study of how Sinn Fein transformed 
themselves from being a relatively unimportant political wing of the IRA to being a 
mainstream political party in the space of 25 years is relevant. Firstly, the story of Sinn Fein 
in the last 40 years is a very good example of how many political movements who use 
violence to achieve their aims, can be forced to change their tactics and use legal and 
peaceful means to try and achieve their political goals. There are a few other examples which 
have similarities to the Sinn Fein situation, such as ETA and the Basque National Liberation 
Movement in the Basque region of northern Spain, which was also involved in a long armed 
struggle against the Spanish government and have only very recently decided to give up their 
weapons and permanently end their armed campaign to make the Basque country an 
independent and sovereign nation separate from Spain (BBC, April 7 2017). There are also 
other examples of political movements who may have refrained from using violence purely 
as a tactic and then used it again along with using and manipulating electoral politics and 
democratic institutions to achieve their aims. One of the prime examples of this was the Nazi 
Party in Germany, who initially tried to gain power through a coup d’etat in 1923 which was 
ultimately a failure (Koonz, 2003, p.21). However, they regrouped throughout the 1920s with 
the help of their charismatic leader Adolf Hitler without having to use violence against the 
state and using democratic means with their goal of destroying those democratic functions if 
they managed to get into power. With the severe economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 
1930s aiding their rise to popularity, the Nazis managed to gain power after the election of 
Hitler as Chancellor of Germany through a strong rise in support for the party in German 
elections after the beginning of the worldwide economic crisis brought on the by the 1929 
Wall Street Crash (Lee, 2003, pp.141-144). Once Hitler became chancellor, he used his 
democratic powers to destroy the democracy which had allowed him to take power, and in its 
place put one of the most brutal and oppressive regimes the world has ever seen. 
There are also many conflicts and peace processes around the world which could probably 
learn lessons from the Northern Ireland conflict in how to persuade a political and/or armed 
group to compromise with their enemies and reach a peaceful agreement which could end a 
conflict, but at the same time, continue to strive to achieve their goals using only political and 
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peaceful means (White, 2013, p. viii-ix). This is one of the main reasons why I believe this 
topic is very important, as it the case study which I will discuss in this thesis is a good 
example of how political movements can change their tactics and use the ballot box rather 
than the barrel of a gun to achieve their goals, as well as being able to compromise with those 
who they are fighting or who have opposing views, as well as being able to convince 
members of a political movement that changing their tactics and short-term goals are the best 
way forward for their movement. There are a number of modern day peace processes which 
could learn from the peace process in Northern Ireland and the willingness of political parties 
there to compromise and not get every wish they or their supporters wanted to get. Some of 
the relevant ones include the ongoing Syrian peace process, which despite many attempts has 
still failed to produce any successful ceasefire since the outbreak of war there in 2011, and 
the long lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace process which has been ongoing since the 1970s but 
has still not reached a final conclusion. Another example is the Colombian peace process, 
which has only very recently become a success story but where for many years, a left-wing 
movement known as FARC had been conducting an armed campaign against the Colombian 
government for over 50 years. FARC were very ideologically similar to the IRA and they 
were known to have been connected to one another (Cragin, Chalk, Daly, 2007,p.78), 
although they did not use electoral politics to increase support for their cause as much as Sinn 
Fein did although there are reasons for that which will be explained in due course. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in particular the Palestinian Liberation Organisation are a 
good example of a political movements who have had have to change their methods from 
using violence to peaceful means in order to try and achieve their political aims. Like Sinn 
Fein, the PLO also have not yet reached their ultimate political goal of an independent 
Palestine, but like Sinn Fein, they also managed to reached a compromise with those they 
were in conflict with e.g. Israel, after many years of using only violent methods to try and 
achieve their goals. When they began their armed struggle against Israel in the 1960s, the 
PLO believed that Palestine was an ‘indivisible territorial unit’ i.e. that in the disputed 
territories, only Palestine alone should exist as a sovereign state and that Israel should not 
exist at all (Palestinian National Charter, 1968). The PLO continued with this stance up until 
1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed between themselves and Israel. These accords 
resulted in the PLO recognising Israel as a sovereign state as well as Israel recognising the 
PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Unfortunately, there has been a lot of 
violence in Israel and Palestine since then, and the situation has still not reached a defining 
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conclusion, but the PLO are a good example of an organisation trying to change their method 
as a way of achieving their goals. 
Of course, there are many organisations which have no wish to enter constitutional politics 
and that always want to use violence or any other method which they believe is the best way 
to achieve their aims, as well as not being forced into a situation where they could only 
achieve their goals through peaceful means (source. A modern day example of this is Islamic 
State (IS), who appear to have no interest in achieving their goals through electoral politics 
and at the moment are only using violence to take over large areas of countries in the Middle 
East such as Iraq and Syria. This is mainly due to their ideology, which espouses a more 
literal interpretation of the Quran and see those who do not follow the religion of Islam the 
way they believe it should be followed as infidels. A good example is of the IS’s view on 
Hamas (the Palestinian organisation which has and continues to be in conflict with Israel), 
where they would rather fight those who they see as not following Islam the way they believe 
it should be followed, before then fighting a Jewish state like Israel which much of the Arab 
world has been conflict with since its creation (Al-Monitor, July 29, 2014). The different 
sects of Islam like the different sects in Christianity makes the situation even more complex, 
with IS supporting only those who follow Salafism and rejecting any sort of new innovations 
within Islam since the time of the prophet Muhammad, with those who refuse to follow IS 
ideology in IS occupied areas being severely punished with many being brutally executed for 
crimes which would be seen as very minor in most western countries. IS have themselves 
stated that they have no interest in democracy or in using electoral politics to increase support 
for their ideology, as doing so in itself would be against their own religious beliefs (Al-
Monitor, July 29 2014). But IS would probably be an exception to most political movements, 
most of which eventually become involved in constitutional politics if they are not successful 
in achieving their goals through armed struggle or other illegal means, and even those who do 
succeed in achieving power illegally often set up political parties after they get into power 
e.g. the Communist Party of Cuba set up in 1965 by Fidel Castro despite the fact that he got 
into power after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. 
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Transformation of political organisations – experiences from Ireland 
There are also quite a few examples in Ireland where movements (many of whom were 
related to Sinn Fein in some way) changed their methods from using violence to using 
electoral politics to try and achieve their goals. One of these is the Workers Party of Ireland, 
who were in fact originally Sinn Fein until 1970. There was a split in the IRA in 1970 
between the Provisionals and the Officials, with the Provisionals supporting an armed 
campaign in Northern Ireland, originally in order to defend Catholics from the type of 
sectarian attacks which had taken place throughout 1969. But this campaign was later to 
become an attempt to force British withdrawal from Northern Ireland with the aim of 
achieving a united Ireland and a 32 county republic, and it was the Provisionals who would 
continue this armed struggle until the 1990s while they also kept the name of the political 
wing of the movement as Sinn Fein, although they were in a minority compared to the 
Officials at the time of the split (Bowyer Bell, 1997, pp.366-68). Meanwhile the Official IRA 
were far more interested in a political solution in Northern Ireland rather than achieving their 
aims using violent methods. After the failure of the Border campaign between 1956 and 
1963, Sinn Fein had become very politically left-wing under the leadership of Cathal 
Goulding, and aimed for a Marxist style workers republic which would unite the Catholic and 
Protestant working classes and end the sectarian conflict between both sides (Sweetman, 
1972, p.146). So due to this view, the leadership of the IRA in 1969 before the split took 
place were against restarting an armed campaign in Northern Ireland, due to their belief that a 
violent campaign would reignite sectarian tensions and divisions, and therefore would be 
unable to overthrow what many of them saw as the capitalist and British imperialist influence 
in Ireland at the time. Now known as the Official IRA, they too had a brief armed struggle 
against British forces until 1972 when they declared a ceasefire, although they were still 
involved in sporadic violent attacks in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, they 
focused on increasing their political support through their political wing, which changed its 
name from Official Sinn Fein to Sinn Fein the Workers Party, and finally to the Workers 
Party of Ireland. For a time in the 1980s, the party had a small amount of electoral support in 
the Republic of Ireland, where they won seats in elections throughout the decade, peaking in 
1989 when they won 7 seats to Dail Eireann and 5% of first preference votes. But with 
allegations continuing about present ties to the Official IRA who were still involved in 
criminal activity, and the fall and dissolution of the Soviet Union which resulted in many 
party members supporting social democracy and free market economics as opposed to a 
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workers republic, another split in the party took place in 1992 which resulted in nearly all of 
its prominent members and elected officials leaving the party to form the Democratic Left, 
although most of the ordinary rank and file members remained with the Workers Party 
(Hanley, Millar, 2009,p.588). Since then the party have had very little electoral success, with 
other far-left parties such as the Socialist Party and the People Before Profit Alliance gaining 
popularity and some electoral success, with the party winning only around 3,000 first 
preference votes at the last 3 general elections in the Republic of Ireland compared to over 
80,000 at the peak of their popularity in the 1989 general election. 
There are also a number of other political movements in Ireland which have changed their 
tactics from using violence to using electoral politics and peaceful means to achieve their 
goals. Interestingly, most of these movements like the Official IRA and the Workers Party, 
were movements that broke away from Sinn Fein and the republican movement at different 
stages throughout the 20th century. The most prominent of these was Fianna Fail, the political 
party which would dominate Irish politics throughout the 20th century, and was the most 
popular party in the Republic from the 1930s until the early 2010s. Fianna Fail was also a 
breakaway movement from Sinn Fein, when in 1926, the leader of Sinn Fein Eamon De 
Valera, proposed that its members attend Dail Eireann rather than abstain from it like they 
had been doing since the passing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922. However, this motion 
was narrowly defeated by party members, and De Valera reacted to this by leaving the party 
and creating his own party, Fianna Fail, along with his supporters. Although a slight majority 
of the party stayed put with Sinn Fein, the vast majority of public support went to the 
charismatic De Valera and his new party after they decided to take their seats in Dail Eireann 
while at the same time, voicing their opposition to the Irish Free State created in 1922 and 
slowly attempting to make the Free State separate from any British influence (O’Beachain, 
2011, p.82-3). The next election following the split resulted in Fianna Fail winning 44 seats, 
and Sinn Fein’s tally being reduced from 47 to 5, a defeat which crushed the party’s electoral 
ambitions for many years to come. By the time of the 1932 general election, Fianna Fail were 
the most popular party in the Irish Free State and defeated their bitter rivals the Cumann na 
nGaedhael party, (which had supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921-22 in dark contrast to 
Sinn Fein and Fianna Fail who had vehemently opposed it). Despite both sides being 
involved in a civil war just 10 years previously, the transition of power from Cumann na 
nGaedhael to Fianna Fail was a peaceful one, and the rise to power of the republican Fianna 
Fail led to the IRA being unbanned. However, with violence and civil unrest taking place 
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between the IRA and the fascist Blueshirts, both organisations were banned in 1935, and 
despite being supportive of their cause and many former IRA members very prominent in 
Fianna Fail, De Valera initiated a very strong anti-IRA policy from the mid-1930s onwards, 
with as many as 6 IRA volunteers being executed for crimes committed in Ireland during the 
Second World War (known as the Emergency in Ireland). Despite many of its prominent 
members playing important roles in the Irish War of Independence and then fighting against 
the newly created state, Fianna Fail were successful in gaining political power in Ireland 
through peaceful means, and under De Valera they even sought to destroy the same 
organisation which had helped them in getting into political power in the first place, the IRA 
(Coogan, 2015, p.229). After coming to power in 1932, Fianna Fail won more seats to the 
Irish parliament than any other party at every general election up until 2011 when they lost 
almost three quarters of their seats after the fall out from the EU/IMF bailout of the Irish state 
in late 2010, but have now recently won back some of the support they lost and are most 
likely to return to government after the next Irish general election. 
Today, Sinn Fein is one of the most popular political parties in both the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland, something which can be traced back to the election of Bobby Sands as 
an MP to the British parliament. But it could be argued that Sinn Fein were not always a 
political party, as they did not run candidates in elections in Ireland for many years, even 
after the beginning of the Troubles in 1969.  According to the author Charles S. Mack, a 
political party in a democracy is a ‘coalition of citizens that operate under a common label to 
nominate candidates for public office, competing with other parties to elect them, for the 
purpose of gaining control of and organisation of the government’ (Mack, 2010, p.19). Going 
on this definition, it can be argued that before they began running candidates in the 1980s, 
Sinn Fein had stopped being political party for many years, since they had last run candidates 
for public office in Ireland in the 1961 Irish general election, where they lost the 4 seats 
which they had won in the 1957 general election on the back of the recently begun 
insurgency against British rule in Northern Ireland known as the Border Campaign. Before 
the election of Bobby Sands and the subsequent change of party policy which allowed 
candidates to run for public office, Sinn Fein had been seen as being purely the political wing 
of the Provisional IRA since the IRA split and beginning of the Troubles in 1969-70, with the 
main focus of the republican movement being on the Provisional IRA and their armed 
struggle against the British forces in Northern Ireland (Hunger, RTE, 2006). But they slowly 
changed their tactics over a 25 year period from using purely violence to using a mixture of 
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violence and electoral politics and eventually ending their use of violent methods and 
focusing solely on electoral politics. 
Reasons for change of the methods of political organisations: differences and similarities 
Why do movements such as Sinn Fein change their methods? As we could see at the 
beginning of the thesis, sometimes they are forced to change their methods as they may be 
unsuccessful in getting what they want. But also broader environments can have an impact. 
Political organisations may be opposed by others who wish to see them defeated, particularly 
if they are fighting against a state and if the state then use the apparatus at their disposal to 
curtail the threat posed by an organisation or movement which may be opposed to the state. 
In the case of Sinn Fein, it depended on who was in power in the Republic of Ireland and in 
the United Kingdom as to whether or not the republican movement should be tamed and 
forced to end their violent campaign, or if they should be defeated altogether. This can be 
seen the differing attitudes of the Irish and British governments during the conflict in 
Northern Ireland: in 1976, the Irish Minister for Posts and Telegraphs Conor Cruise O’Brien 
amended an already present censorship law banning content which promoted violence to also 
ban the broadcasting the voices of those who were affiliated to organisations such as Sinn 
Fein, meaning that it would be illegal for any Sinn Fein member to publicly discuss or 
promote themselves or the party on air or on television in the Republic of Ireland (The 
Guardian, December 19, 2008). This hard line stance was a stance that even the British 
government had not taken at that stage, although this hard line view towards Irish republicans 
would be taken up by Margaret Thatcher after she became Prime Minister in 1979 (Blundell, 
2008, p.131). There was already a tough stance against republicans in Northern Ireland using 
violence as seen in the policy of Ulsterisation, but her stance against the hunger strikers in 
1981 almost made it seem that she wanted the IRA to be completely destroyed, with her view 
on the hunger strikers being that they were criminals rather than political prisoners. This 
stance almost certainly had the opposite effect of what Thatcher was trying to achieve, in that 
it made the IRA more popular and earned them more support and sympathy towards their 
cause, with deaths of 10 IRA and INLA members on hunger strike leading to the beginning 
of the republican movement taking an active part in electoral politics, and in the short and 
long term, leading to an increase in support for Irish republicans (Seldon, Collings, 2014, 
p.102-3). But it could also be argued that her hard-line stance which led to republicans 
becoming more active in electoral politics was the beginning of the end of the IRA’s armed 
struggle, as the republican movement slowly moved away from violence towards electoral 
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politics due to the initial success of republican candidates in Irish elections during the 1981 
hunger strike. 
In relation to the Colombian group FARC, a similar strategy to what Thatcher used against 
the IRA was used by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe while he was in power from 2002 to 
2010. He attempted to defeat and destroy FARC by violent means using the state apparatus 
(the Colombian army) and was also being supported by the United States in his fight against 
FARC. After a number of attacks and killings by FARC in 2003, the Colombian government 
under Uribe significantly upped its campaign to fight FARC, with Uribe declaring his 
intention to take back FARC controlled areas (Henderson, 2015, p.168). This campaign was 
to be a relative success for Uribe throughout his presidency, with FARC being driven into the 
border regions of Colombia, one of its leading members being killed in a bombing raid with 
another being murdered by his own bodyguard, and many hostages held by FARC being 
released or escaping from captivity. But despite his best attempts and significantly weakening 
FARC, Uribe did not defeat them, nor did he end the ongoing civil war, and it would be his 
predecessor Juan Manuel Santos who would enter peace talks with FARC which would 
eventually lead to the end of the conflict and FARC ending their armed campaign and using 
peaceful means and electoral politics to mobilise support for themselves. Rather than destroy 
them, Santos has attempted to integrate FARC into Colombian politics, in a similar way to 
how the British and Irish governments since the 1990s have tried to integrate the IRA into 
Irish politics while at the same time, persuading them to end using violence and use only 
peaceful means to further their political cause. 
But it could also be argued that as both conflicts became so prolonged, they did so because of 
the inability of the Irish and British and Colombian states to defeat the IRA and FARC, and 
with both conflicts resulting in a stalemate situation with neither side getting any closer to 
defeating the other, a peace agreement was eventually reached which led to some of the 
demands of the IRA and FARC being agreed to i.e., the Belfast Agreement in 1998 and the  
final peace agreement between FARC and the Colombian government in 2016. So despite not 
getting everything that they wanted, the IRA and FARC were not completed defeated, but 
instead they have reinvented themselves from being paramilitary movements with a strong 
focus on using violence to achieve their goals, to becoming part of the political party system 
and trying to achieve their goals using electoral politics without having to resort to violence. 
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Another example of a movement forced to change their methods to increase its support and 
achieve its goals legally is the Nazi Party in Germany, when after the failure of the Beer Hall 
Putsch in Munich in November 1923, they decided to take a more constitutional path through 
electoral politics in order to gain political power (Koonz, 2003, p.24). From there, they 
slowly built up their support base throughout the German electorate, and by 1933, Adolf 
Hitler had managed to become German Chancellor. It can also depend on how strict a 
country’s government or laws are on organisations which use violence, and the attitude of 
those who hold political power and the views of the political establishment in each country 
on whether or not they want to either completely destroy organisations which use violence or 
just try and pacify them in order to stop them use violence and use constitutional politics to 
achieve their aims. 
There are quite a few similarities between the Colombian group FARC and Sinn Fein, they 
both have left-wing political ideologies, they both have been involved in long-term armed 
struggles against the governments of the countries that they are in, and both have decided to 
end their armed struggles and try and achieve their goals through electoral politics (Innes, 
2012, p.147). The armed struggle of FARC in Colombia began as far back as 1964, and for 
the first years of the struggle, the fighting against the Colombian state took the form of 
guerrilla warfare in rural areas of Colombia. At the very beginning of the conflict, FARC had 
less than 50 soldiers, those who had escaped from an attack by the Colombian army and fled 
into the mountains to form the movement (Osterling, Sanin, 1989, p.280). Over the next 20 
years or so, FARC remained quite ineffective but it was slowly increasing its membership, 
and due to its increasing revenue from the production and exporting of cocaine from FARC 
held areas, the movement decided to embark on a more ambitious military strategy by having 
a full scale guerrilla army which would launch large attacks on the Colombian army, as well 
as trying to gain a foothold in areas nearer to cities in order to take over as much of the 
economic infrastructure as possible to keep financing their campaign against the Colombian 
state (De la Pedreja, 2013, p.94). They also profited heavily from the illegal drugs trade and 
extortion, at one point almost 90% of their revenue coming from selling cocaine and 
extorting businesses of the areas where they were active (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 
July 6 2010). From 1982 onwards, FARC increased their military campaign, which would 
result in the Colombian government deciding to negotiate with them in order to end their 
armed campaign, and a ceasefire was declared in 1984 (Taylor, 2009, pp.153-4). Around the 
same time, FARC and the Colombian communist party joined forces to from the Patriotic 
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Union party, a left-wing socialist party created to challenge the hegemony of the conservative 
and liberal parties in Colombian politics. It was almost like a political wing of FARC, but 
within 3 years of its creation, almost 400 members were assassinated around Colombia, 
including the president of the party who had run as a candidate in the Colombian presidential 
election in 1986 (Osterling, 1988, p.194). It is believed that many of these assassinations 
were orchestrated by the Colombian government in order to wipe out any alternative political 
opposition to the two main partied in Colombia at the time, with Amnesty International 
stating in 1988 that the Colombian government were pursuing a ‘deliberate policy of political 
murder’ against UP members as well as anyone else who they believed to be a threat 
(Carnelian International, 2004). These assassinations resulted in the decline of the party 
which in turn led to the end of the FARC ceasefire and the restart of FARC’s armed 
campaign against the Colombian state. FARC’s armed campaign continued through the 1990s 
and despite many negotiations taking place between them and the government, no solution 
was found to end the conflict. 
There was in fact a connection between FARC and Sinn Fein and the IRA, which was 
exposed in 2001 when three Irishmen, two of whom were alleged to be IRA members with 
the third being Sinn Fein’s representative in Cuba, were arrested in Colombia and accused of 
assisting FARC with making bombs (New York Times, April 24 2002). After a long judicial 
process, the three men were convicted of training FARC rebels and sentenced to 17 years 
each in prison. However, they managed to escape while on bail and made their way back to 
Ireland a number of months after they had escaped from Colombia (BBC, August 5 2005). 
This episode resulted in more negative publicity for both FARC and the Irish republican 
movement, but it also showed the connections between the various left-wing paramilitaries 
around the world. Throughout the 2000s, FARC were beginning to tone down their armed 
campaign and were taking a more conciliatory approach, by releasing many hostages that 
they had kidnapped and held ransom for many years, and even some of their sympathisers 
such as Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez asking them to end their armed struggle (Fox 
News, June 9 2008). Similarly to the IRA, it took many years for FARC to finally decide to 
end their armed struggle, which was helped by the Colombian government’s willingness to 
find a peaceful solution to the war after Juan Manuel Santos became president. The peace 
process in Colombia also helped by a group of nations known as ALBA, which included 
Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua along with some small states in the 
Caribbean, who were sympathetic to FARC’s cause but were also instrumental in convincing 
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FARC to drop their weapons and pursue their goals through electoral politics, although the 
nations of ALBA may have also done this for their own political gain (Humire, Berman, 
2014, p.29). Nevertheless, from 2012 onwards, negotiations took place in Cuba between 
FARC and the Colombian government took place, which resulted in a peace agreement being 
agreed by both sides and FARC deciding to end their armed campaign on June 23 2016 
(BBC, June 23 2016). This peace agreement was put to the Colombian electorate as a 
referendum on October 2, but it was narrowly defeated, resulting in parts of the agreement 
being revised to ensure that it would be implemented and that FARC would permanently end 
their armed campaign. These revised terms were passed by both sections of the Colombian 
parliament, and it led to FARC decommissioning many of their weapons on June 27 2017 to 
the United Nations in an official ceremony with the FARC leadership and the Colombian 
president in attendance. From now on, FARC intend on achieving their political and social 
goals through electoral politics, with the peace agreement allowing them to legally form as a 
political party. The peace agreement also provides for rural development and investment, 
something which FARC had wished for since the beginning of its existence (The Guardian, 
June 23, 2016). 
Another organisation which has gone down a path similar to that of Sinn Fein has been the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO is now recognised as the ‘sole 
representative of the Palestinian people’ by over 100 countries which have diplomatic 
relations with the Palestinian state (Geldenhuys, 1990, p.155). However, Palestine is still not 
recognised as a sovereign state by the United Nations, and for many years, the PLO was 
recognised as a terrorist organisation by the United States and the PLO’s main enemy, Israel 
(US Congress, December 22 1987). Founded in 1964, the PLO’s main aim was to liberate the 
homeland of Palestine, which they saw as a national duty along with promoting and 
preserving Arab unity (Palestine National Charter, 1964). This was to be done by whatever 
means necessary, a stance which would lead to the on and off violent conflict between the 
PLO and Israel for many years after. There are many different factions and political 
movements within the PLO, the main one being Fatah which was led for many years by 
Yasser Arafat, arguably the most prominent individual involved in the conflict on the 
Palestinian side. Arafat was the chairman of the PLO from 1969 until shortly before his death 
in 2004, and during his time as leader, the PLO went from being a relatively small 
organisation to one of the most well-known political movements in the world, with Arafat 
being at the centre of many conferences and negotiations to try and find a solution to end the 
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the beginning of the PLO’s armed campaign against Israel, 
Arafat declared his aim to be to ‘liberate the land from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan 
river, and to uproot the Zionist entity from our land’ (Gilbert, 1998, p.418). This indicates the 
PLO’s wish for a Palestinian state which would take over the State of Israel and result in a 
Palestinian state but no Israeli state. Due to the military strength of Israel along with them 
being a close ally of the United States, this scenario was always going to be unlikely to occur, 
and the Palestinian’s continuing stubbornness in this regard is arguably one of the main 
reasons why it took such a long time for any real progress to be made towards a peace 
process between Israel and the PLO. 
After the failure of the PLO’S allies Egypt and Syria to defeat Israel in the Yom Kippur War 
in 1973, the PLO decided to try and take over areas where they were strong and had a large 
amount of support such as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, areas which are still under the 
control of the PLO to this day. With the assistance of their allies in Israel’s neighbouring 
countries such as Lebanon and Syria, the PLO undertook a guerrilla war against Israel from 
the 1970s right up until the 1990s, while at the same time, they were heavily involved in the 
Lebanese civil war (Halliday, 2005, p.117). After Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the 
PLO moved their headquarters away from Lebanon to Tunisia, and man have said that this 
led to their isolation and a move towards finding a peaceful settlement which would 
eventually lead to the Oslo Accords in 1993 (Khalidi, 2006, p.180). They also changed their 
stance on a number of issues in the late 1980s, partly as a response to the beginning of the 
First Intifada in 1987. 
With the PLO in exile in Tunisia, they were not able to influence events in Palestine as much 
as they liked (Khalidi, 2006, p.180). Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat decided to take a 
more moderate and diplomatic approach by recognising the State of Israel which they had 
never previously done, and to recognise the United Nations resolutions on the Israel-Palestine 
conflict along with accepting the two-state solution, which would entail Israel and Palestine 
each having their own sovereign state (Shlaim, 2000, p.466). At the same time, the PLO 
declared Palestine to be an independent state, even though Israel was occupying a large 
portion of what the PLO was claiming to be their own territory. This more diplomatic stance 
by the PLO led to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 between Yasser Arafat and Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin which was facilitated by US President Bill Clinton. This 
agreement resulted in parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (areas occupied mainly by 
Palestinians) being governed by a Palestinian authority, but it still did not give the PLO the 
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state they wished for. The Oslo Accords did end the First Intifada against Israel and the 
following years were relatively peaceful until 2000 when the hugely significant Camp David 
Summit took place. This was arguably the best chance for a permanent solution to end the 
conflict, as the PLO were offered an independent state for Palestine by Israel in 73% of the 
West Bank territory (which could increase to 92% in the following years) and 100% of the 
Gaza Strip (Pressman, 2003). But due to a number of other issues such as Israel refusing to 
accede to the Palestinian demand that all the Palestinian refugees displaced during the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war, including all the descendants of those refugees be allowed to return to their 
homes in Palestine, no agreement was reached with Arafat refusing to agree to the proposals 
on offer. This would result in the beginning of the Second Intifada between 2000 and 2005, 
and the rise to power of Hamas, a rival Palestinian nationalist movement who had become far 
more militant than Fatah and the rest of the PLO. As of the last 10 to 15 years and 
particularly after the death of Yasser Arafat, the PLO’s popularity has decreased quite 
substantially, although they are still recognised by many nations as being the representative 
of the Palestinian people. Like the IRA and FARC, the PLO have stopped using violence as a 
method of achieving their goals, but at the same time, other Palestinian nationalist 
organisations such as Hamas have continued to use violent methods to try and achieve their 
goals. In the last 15 years or so, Hamas have overtaken the PLO in terms of their significance 
to the Palestinian cause through their political victories against Fatah and the PLO, and their 
continuing use of force against Israel during that time. (New York Times, January 26 2006). 
There are quite a few similarities between the IRA, FARC and the PLO, such as all three 
organisations have yet to achieve their prime goals of a united Ireland, taking over Colombia 
and an independent Palestinian state (although the PLO rejected an offer for it at the Camp 
David Accords in 2000 as it did not meet their demands). They are also connected to each 
other and sympathetic towards each others political cause, with the link between FARC and 
the IRA being exposed in the early 2000s with the arrest and conviction of three Irishmen 
believed to be IRA members for training FARC fighters, and Sinn Fein’s continued support 
of the Palestinian cause with Gerry Adams visiting the region on many occasions, with him 
even being barred from visiting the Gaza Strip by Israeli authorities in 2014 (The Guardian, 5 
December 2014).  Both the IRA and FARC had left wing political ideologies which led both 
organisations to fight for social as well as political change in Ireland and Colombia, and both 
have now decided to end their armed campaigns and pursue their goals through politics and 
peaceful means. Despite being unable to achieve their goals through using violent methods, 
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both of them have made progress towards achieving their goals since they began their 
campaigns against their enemies, and they have also been facilitated by the British and Irish 
and Colombian governments to use political movements to further their cause rather than 
using violent methods to fight or overthrow the state. The IRA, FARC and the PLO all 
negotiated for peace settlements as they were unable to achieve their goals through the use of 
force, but because of the political and social impact they caused from their armed campaigns, 
they were able to reach agreements with the respective governments who also wished for an 
end to their violent campaigns. 
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Case study: The transformation of Sinn Fein into a mainstream political party 1981-2007 
 
4 Sinn Fein: 1905-1981 
The election of Bobby Sands, a convicted member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) who was serving a jail sentence in the infamous Maze Prison, to the British Parliament 
on April 9 1981, will undoubtedly go down as one of the most important days in Irish 
political history (Swaim, 2015, p.272). From this electoral success began the slow rise to 
power of Sinn Fein, what for many years had been the political wing of the Provisional IRA, 
which had rarely involved itself in elections in Ireland, and was seen as being in the shadow 
of its military wing, the IRA. Although Sands himself was not representing Sinn Fein in his 
successful election to the British Parliament, his success was to lead to Sinn Fein running 
candidates in local, national and European elections within a number of years. The success of 
Sands’ election would also lead to the Republican Movement (the name used for a 
combination of Sinn Fein and the IRA) placing a far stronger emphasis on gaining power and 
influence through the ballot box rather than through physical force, although the armed 
struggle against British rule in Ireland was continued by the IRA for many years to come 
(White,1993,p.141-3). 
Sinn Fein was and still is the oldest Irish political party in existence, being founded in 1905 
by Arthur Griffith. It made little or no impact on Irish politics until the aftermath of the 1916 
Easter Rising, a failed attempt to overthrow British rule in Ireland led by the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB), a secret society dedicated to creating a democratic and independent Irish 
republic. Although Sinn Fein had no official involvement in organising or staging the rising, 
much of the press in Britain and Ireland laid much of the blame for the rising on the party due 
to some of their members being involved in the rising, along with the fact that Sinn Fein were 
one of the few political parties in Ireland that were against Irish people fighting in World War 
1 as well as having even more radical ideas than the moderate and mainstream Irish 
nationalist party, which was the most popular political party in Ireland at the time 
(Feeney,2002, pp.56-57). This resulted in the party’s founder Arthur Griffith, stepping aside 
as leader in 1917 in favour of Eamon De Valera, one of the few surviving leaders of the 
failed rebellion of 1916. De Valera was seen to be far more of a republican who wanted to 
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see Ireland become a sovereign state and free from British rule entirely, something in 
common with the leaders of the 1916 rising and a stance which would eventually lead to war 
between Ireland and Britain. De Valera led the party into the 1918 British general election, 
the first election held after the end of World War 1. The election produced a dramatic result 
in Ireland, with Sinn Fein winning 73 out of a possible 105 seats in Ireland, destroying the 
dominant Irish Party which had been agitating for an Irish parliament within the United 
Kingdom for the previous 40 years. But with an election manifesto stating their intention to 
establish an Irish parliament in Dublin and to re-affirm the principles of the Declaration of 
the Irish Republic made at the beginning of the Easter Rising in 1916, the Irish people had 
showed their intention for an independent Ireland free from British rule (Beresford Ellis, 
1985, p.240). 
With this election victory, the Sinn Fein MPs who were elected to the British parliament did 
not go there, but instead set up their own parliament in Dublin which sat for the first time on 
21 January 1919. However on the same day, an IRA led ambush in County Tipperary which 
resulted in the death of two police officers led to the beginning of the Irish War of 
Independence, with the IRA and one side (many of whom were also Sinn Fein members) and 
the British forces in Ireland on the other side. This was a brutal and bloody war with many 
atrocities being committed, particularly by the British forces who often burned towns and 
villages in retaliation for being ambushed by the IRA who often used guerrilla warfare style 
tactics (Dinan, 1987, p.105). After almost two and a half years of conflict, a truce was agreed 
in July 1921, and the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in December 1921 which gave 26 out of 
the 32 counties of Ireland, dominion status within the British empire and would be known as 
the Irish Free State. But it was not the republic which Sinn Fein had been campaigning for, 
and it would also result in the partition of Ireland into two different jurisdictions with the 
Irish Free State being Irish nationalist and Catholic dominated, and Northern Ireland being 
Ulster unionist and Protestant dominant. The debate in the Irish parliament in January 1922 
was extremely divisive, and it would result in the first split within the Sinn Fein party 
between those who supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty and those who were against it (Pro-
Treaty and Anti-Treaty). The parliament passed the treaty by a very slim majority of 64 to 57, 
with those opposed to the treaty staging a walk out from the parliament led by Sinn Fein 
leader Eamon De Valera who himself was strongly opposed to the treaty. In the ensuing 
general election in June 1921, the pro-Treaty Sinn Fein candidates won 58 seats compared to 
only 36 won by the anti-Treaty side, proof that the majority of the Irish electorate supported 
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the Anglo-Irish Treaty (Elections Ireland, 2018). However, many if not the majority of the 
IRA members which had fought in the War of Independence did not support the treaty, which 
would lead to more conflict in the form of the Irish Civil War between the newly created pro-
Treaty government backed Irish National Army, and the IRA which still saw themselves as 
being the legitimate army of the Ireland and of the Irish republic declared in 1916 that they 
still swore their allegiance to. This civil war lasted almost one year until the anti-Treaty IRA 
lay down their weapons, unable to defeat the pro-Treaty national army. 
The pro-treaty wing of Sinn Fein left to form a new political party called Cumann 
naGaedhael in 1923, while the rest of the Sinn Fein party remained opposed to the Anglo-
Irish Treaty and continued their boycott of Dail Eireann even though they were the second 
most popular party in the newly established Irish Free State. But another split in Sinn Fein 
was to occur in 1926, when after a motion led by De Valera to end the party’s abstentionist 
stance to Dail Eireann was narrowly defeated, the large minority who favoured entering the 
Dail left the party to form Fianna Fail, a new republican party led and founded by De Valera 
and his supporters (Kelly, 2013, p.9). Despite taking a minority Sinn Fein members with 
them, Fianna Fail managed to take the vast majority of seats to the Dail that Sinn Fein had 
previously had, and as a result of the first general election after the split within Sinn Fein and 
the creation of Fianna Fail, Sinn Fein managed to have just 6 seats to Dail Eireann after 
previously having won 44 seats at the 1923 general election which took place in the aftermath 
of the Irish Civil War (Hopkinson, 1988, p.262). The situation became even worse when after 
the June 1927 election produced a stalemate situation, another election was called for 
September of that year, and due to the lack of funds within Sinn Fein, they were unable to 
afford to even run candidates in the upcoming election, effectively ensuring that the party 
were gone as a major political force in Ireland for the foreseeable future (Laffan, 1999, 
p.444).  The decision by de Valera to leave Sinn Fein and form his own anti-Treaty 
republican party, and the decision by thousands of voters to transfer their support and money 
towards Fianna Fail instead almost destroyed Sinn Fein, and they had little or no impact on 
the Irish electoral and political scene until just before the Border Campaign which began in 
1956. 
In the 1955 British election, Sinn Fein ran candidates in constituencies in Northern Ireland 
for the first time since their successful 1918 election. They nominated their candidates before 
the Nationalist party in Northern Ireland did so, and in order not to split the Irish nationalist 
and republican vote, they did not run any candidates themselves. This allowed Sinn Fein to 
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win 2 seats to the British parliament, and it was the beginning of a brief revival of both Sinn 
Fein and the IRA. Since the late 1940s, the relationship between them which had been non-
existent for many years after the creation of Fianna Fail and defection of most of its 
membership in the late 1920s was mended under the leadership of Paddy McLogan, Tomas 
McCurtain and Tony Magan, and from then on the IRA was preparing to begin a new armed 
struggle against British forces in Northern Ireland with many raids on army barracks in 
Ireland and Britain taking place in the mid-1950s (White, 2006, pp.38-50).  This armed 
campaign eventually began in December 1956 when around 150 IRA volunteers attacked a 
number of strategic targets along the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland (Hanley, Millar, 2009, p.14). The Border Campaign was an attempt by a rejuvenated 
IRA to fight against what they saw as the British occupying forces in Ireland and to try and 
force them to leave Ireland. The first few weeks of the conflict saw many incidents and a 
number of deaths on both sides, including the deaths of IRA volunteers Fergal O’Hanlon and 
Sean South which led to them becoming Irish republican martyrs and gaining sympathy from 
the general public in Ireland towards the IRA’s cause (English, 2008, p.74). Then in March 
1957, Sinn Fein decided to run candidates in the Irish general election on the back of the 
Border Campaign, winning 4 seats to Dail Eireann and gaining 5.4% of first preference votes 
with most of their popularity coming from the border counties in the Republic (Elections 
Ireland, 2018). But the military campaign of the IRA was to be a failure, as both governments 
in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland arrested and interned the majority of IRA 
leaders involved in the campaign at an early stage. The campaign continued up until 1962 but 
they were very few incidents after the first few months of what the IRA called Operation 
Harvest (English, 2008, p.73). The political support that was won in the early stage of the 
campaign was also lost in the following elections, with Sinn Fein losing its 2 seats to the 
British parliament in the 1959 general election and its 4 seats to Dail Eireann in the 1961 
Irish general election (Patterson, 2006, p.180). 
After the failure of the Border Campaign, Sinn Fein and the IRA began to take a more 
political and Marxist ideological approach under the leadership of Cathal Goulding. By 1967, 
Sinn Fein had even amended its constitution to declare that its main goal was ‘the 
establishment of a democratic socialist republic based on the principles of the proclamation 
of Easter Week 1916 (Swan, 2007, p.195). The IRA was very weak after the failure of the 
Border Campaign and another armed campaign looked very unlikely, until the civil unrest in 
Northern Ireland which began in the last 1960s. What originally started out as a civil rights 
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movement calling for Catholics in Northern Ireland to receive equal rights led to a crackdown 
by police in Northern Ireland against the protests of the civil rights movement, which slowly 
turned into sectarian violence between Catholics and Protestants and also involved the police 
and eventually the British Army by August 1969. At this point, there was fierce rioting taking 
place in Belfast and Derry and other towns across Northern Ireland, with many members of 
the now weakened IRA calling on the leadership to defend nationalist areas from being 
attacked from the police and loyalists. They did so but not to the effect that many wished for, 
which would ultimately lead to the split in the republican movement a few months later 
between the more political minded Official IRA, and the more militant Provisional IRA 
(Hanley, Millar, 2009, pp.130-137). The Official IRA’S political wing was to become Sinn 
Fein the Workers Party before styling itself just as the Workers Party a number of years later, 
while the political wing of the Provisional IRA remained as Sinn Fein. This republican 
movement now led by Ruairi O’Bradaigh actively began to take on both the police and the 
British army in Northern Ireland in a renewed attempt to cause British withdrawal from 
Northern Ireland. This campaign was far more intense than the Border Campaign and in 
comparison, much of the clashes between those involved took place in Belfast and Derry. On 
the political front, Sinn Fein promoted and supported the activities of the Provisional IRA, 
protesting against the introduction of internment without trial in August 1971 and drawing up 
their proposed federal united Ireland which could be created after a future British withdrawal 
(Taylor, 1997, p.104). The membership of Sinn Fein at this time was also mainly confined to 
those who were unable to fight, and those who could fight took an active part in the 
Provisional IRA instead (Feeney, 2002, p.260). This stance continued right up until the 1981 
hunger strikes, when the opportunity arose for a pro-republican prisoner candidate to contest 
the by-election in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, which led to the leader of the hunger 
strikers, Bobby Sands, being chosen to run for the British parliament. 
According to Panebianco, this change in methods in relation to contesting elections could be 
seen as evidence of a new order within Sinn Fein and the IRA at that time. (Panebianco, 
1988, p.243) Although Adams and McGuinness were not officially in charge of the 
republican movement at this time, they were without doubt the most powerful people within 
the movement during the hunger strikes (Hunger, RTE, 2006), and although the attempt to 
move towards using electoral politics to increase popularity came about much earlier than 
intended, it did cement the newly acquired positions of power which Adams and McGuinness 
would use to gain even more authority over the movement in the years ahead (Panebianco, 
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1988, p.243). This was to be the beginning of a change in strategy in Sinn Fein and the IRA 
where Sinn Fein would attempt to become a political force while at the same time, the IRA 
would simultaneously continue their armed campaign against British rule in Ireland, in what 
would later become known as the Armalite and Ballot Box strategy (O’Brien, 1995, p.127). 
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5 The 1981 hunger strikes, Anti H-Block electoral campaign and the Armalite and Ballot Box 
Strategy 
 
The election of Bobby Sands came about after the sudden death of the Independent 
Republican MP for the constituency of Fermanagh and South Tyrone, Frank Maguire on 
March 5 1981. Just a few days previously on March 1, as the Officer Commanding (OC) of 
the IRA prisoners in the Maze Prison outside Belfast, Sands went on hunger strike in protest 
at the living conditions of republican prisoners in the prison. The aim of the hunger strike was 
to secure political status they had lost in 1976  (after March 1 1976, republican prisoners 
were being treated as ordinary prisoners rather than political prisoners) by obtaining their 
‘Five Demands’, the right to not have to wear a prison uniform, to not have to do prison 
work, free association with other prisoners, to be allowed one visit, one parcel and one letter 
per week, and to have full restoration of remission lost through the protest (Taylor, 1997, 
pp.229-34). There had already been a number of attempts through the infamous blanket 
protests and an earlier hunger strike in late 1980 which was ended after 53 days when one of 
the hunger strikers was close to death, but these efforts did not bring about any change in 
British government policy towards the prisoners. However, it soon became clear that Bobby 
Sands was far more determined and willing to sacrifice his own life in order to obtain the 
‘Five Demands’, and his attitude along with the other hunger strikers led to the hunger strike 
in the Maze Prison in 1981 becoming one of the most important moments in recent Irish 
history. 
The hunger strike would almost certainly have not received as much publicity as it did were it 
not for the decision that Bobby Sands would run as a candidate in the Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone by-election in April 1981. From a republican point of view, it was a huge risk to run 
Sands as a candidate. Firstly, republicans or anyone closely associated with the IRA had not 
run for election since the Troubles had begun in 1969, and it was alleged that to even speak 
of contesting elections was illegal under the IRA constitution (Hunger, RTE, 2006). 
Secondly, there was also the risk that if a republican candidate did contest the election but 
lost, it could be a devastating blow to the republican movement and prove to many of its 
critics that there were not enough support for the IRA’s armed campaign for it to ever be 
successful. On the other hand if a republican candidate who was also highlighting the plight 
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of the hunger strikers in the Maze prison were to be elected, it would prove that there was 
support for the hunger strikers among much of the population, but it would also give the 
republican movement a mandate to attempt to begin negotiations with the British government 
to try to resolve the situation at the time and potentially reach some sort of agreement which 
could be favourable to Irish nationalists and republicans (Hunger, RTE, 2006). So it was 
agreed by republicans in Northern Ireland that as the leader of the Maze Prison hunger strike, 
Bobby Sands would be the ideal candidate to be put forward in the Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone by-election, with Sands agreeing to put his name forward despite being in prison at 
the time. 
A theory put forward by Panebianco also deals with political parties adapting and reacting to 
changes in ‘external environments’ i.e. in this case, the sudden by-election which occurred at 
the same time as the hunger strikes, giving Bobby Sands and the republican movement a way 
of highlighting their cause and increasing their support base. (Panebianco, 1988, p.49). 
Panebianco also discusses the ‘genetic model’ of a political party, factors which he says ‘give 
the organisation its mark and define his characteristics’ (Panebianco, 1988, p.49). He then 
goes on to say that one of the main principles determining a party’s genetic model is the 
absence or presence of an ‘external sponsor’ which if in place, will lead to the party’s 
followers more than likely following to this external institution rather than the party itself 
(Panebianco, 1988, p.51). This is very true in the case of the republican movement at the time 
of the 1981 hunger strike, whereby the IRA was seen as the dominant section of the 
republican movement in comparison to its political wing Sinn Fein, which had not contested 
elections in many years and had had no interest in doing so until Bobby Sands was put 
forward as a candidate in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election during the hunger 
strike.  
Sands ran for election under the label of Anti H-Block (as the Maze prison where the hunger 
strikes took place was built in the shape of the letter H), and the main reason given by his 
supporters to vote for him in the by-election was that by voting for him to be a British 
Member of Parliament, it would surely prevent him from starving himself to death and that it 
would lead to republican prisoners gaining political status. Due to the pressure that was put 
on by Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA, no other Irish nationalist candidate put their names 
forward for election (Hunger, RTE, 2006). This left just two candidates contesting one seat, 
Sands, and the Ulster Unionist candidate Harry West. Of course, having one candidate each 
from both sides of the political divide was inevitably going to split the vote according to 
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people’s political views and their religion (Roman Catholics would usually vote for a 
nationalist candidate, Protestants would usually vote for a unionist candidate) (Criddle, 
Waller, 1999, p.294). The demographics of the Fermanagh South Tyrone constituency made 
this even more interesting, as it was almost evenly divided between unionist and nationalists 
voters, ensuring that the election would more than likely be very close. But as Sands came 
from a republican viewpoint which supported violence against the British state, some 
unionists such as Ken Maginnis believed that nationalists who did not agree with using 
violence to achieve their political goals would not vote for Sands and that instead may vote 
for the unionist candidate (Hunger, RTE, 2006). However, this did not come to pass, and 
Sands claimed a narrow victory winning 51.2% to West’s 48.8%, with a high turnout of 
almost 87% (Northern Ireland, 2010). This electoral victory was seen as a huge success for 
the republican movement, as well as an embarrassing defeat for Margaret Thatcher and her 
hard line policy against republican prisoners. Despite this defeat however, Thatcher 
continued to refuse to give in to the demands of the prisoners even though one of them was 
now a member of the British parliament. And so after a campaign by the republican 
movement encouraging the electorate of Fermanagh and South Tyrone to vote for Bobby 
Sands in order to obtain the ‘Five Demands’ for the republican prisoners in the Maze Prison 
and to save his life, Sands died on May 5, 26 days after his election to the British Parliament 
and 66 days after his hunger strike had begun. Despite the death of a British MP, the British 
government still held firm and refused to grant political status to republican prisoners, with 
Margaret Thatcher commenting that Sands’ death was a convicted criminal who chose to take 
his own life (Taylor, 1997, pp.243-44). This hard line stance of the British government 
undoubtedly increased sympathy and support for the IRA, with 100,000 people attending 
Sands’ funeral and severe rioting taking place throughout Northern Ireland. 
Meanwhile in the Republic of Ireland, a general election had been scheduled to take place on 
June 11. Before this election took place, another 3 hunger strikers died in the Maze Prison, 
fuelling emotions among Irish republicans and nationalists even more and increasing support 
for the cause of the prisoners. After the election of Bobby Sands, the Anti H-Block 
committee who had organised the election campaign for Sands decided to run candidates in 
the general election in the Republic. 9 candidates were endorsed by the Anti H-Block 
committee, 8 of whom were prisoners, and despite having almost no funding and no media 
exposure like other parties due to the censorship laws in place at the time, they managed to 
win 15% of first preference votes in the constituencies they contested, with hunger striker 
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Kieran Doherty and fellow prisoner Paddy Agnew being elected in the border constituencies 
of Cavan-Monaghan and Louth, and other hunger strikers Martin Hurson and Joe McDonnell 
narrowly failing to be elected (Sweeney, 2010, p.233). This was a remarkable result 
considering the fact that the republican movement had not had any real success in elections 
since the Border Campaign in the late 1950s and had appeared to have little or no interest in 
even contesting elections. But this was to change in the coming years, particularly with the 
rise to power within the republican movement of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness.  
Through all of this the hunger strike continued, with the death toll rising to 10 prisoners in the 
end including Irish Member of Parliament Kieran Doherty. The last prisoner to die on hunger 
strike was Michael Devine on August 20, the same day on which Owen Carron, who had 
been the election agent for Bobby Sands a few months previously, was elected as an MP for 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone in the by-election caused by the death of Sands, with an 
increased vote from Sands’ election (Northern Ireland Elections, 2017). The hunger strike 
ended on October 3 with four of the ‘Five Demands’ being granted to the prisoners, but 
despite the death of 10 young men, the hunger strikes were a political success for the 
republican movement, increasing its support across Ireland but more importantly, giving it 
the confidence to contest elections on a regular basis and to slowly evolve from believing that 
violence was the only way to end British rule in Northern Ireland to believing that success at 
the ballot box could also bring about what they wanted to achieve. This view was echoed by 
Danny Morrison, one of the most prominent members of the republican movement behind 
Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness and one of the main negotiators with the British 
government during the hunger strike, said in October 1981 at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (Irish 
for convention) ‘Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But 
will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other, we 
take power in Ireland?’ (Taylor, 1997, pp.281-82).  This statement was the origin for the 
phrase ‘The Armalite and Ballot Box strategy’ to describe this shift in policy of the 
republican movement to contest elections while at the same time, continuing the armed 
struggle against British rule in Northern Ireland (BBC, 2001).  
The success that the republican movement had had in the 1981 elections resulted in the return 
of Sinn Fein to electoral politics in Ireland. Since the beginning of the Troubles, Sinn Fein 
had been seen as being purely the political mouthpiece of the Provisional IRA, but had played 
a very minor role in the conflict itself with the belief within the republican movement being 
that only the IRA could bring about British withdrawal from Northern Ireland through its 
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armed struggle. But due to the success of the Anti H-Block candidates, Sinn Fein decided to 
field candidates in the 1982 election to the Northern Ireland assembly, an election which was 
another attempt to try and form a government in Northern Ireland which would share power 
between unionists and nationalists, as Northern Ireland had been ruled directly from Britain 
since 1972.  Sinn Fein campaigned on the basis that they were against power-sharing with 
unionists, and that the only credible solution to the ongoing crisis was British withdrawal 
from Northern Ireland, with their campaign slogan being ‘Break the British connection: 
Smash Stormont’ (Frampton, 2009, p.1). This election resulted in Sinn Fein winning 10% of 
first preference votes and 5 out of 78 seats, with Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness 
among those being elected (Northern Ireland Elections, 2017). This result was seen as a sign 
that quite a large minority of people in Northern Ireland supported the republican movement, 
and that there was potential for Sinn Fein to become a strong political force in Northern 
Ireland and possibly in the Republic as well, although they were still a long way behind the 
moderate SDLP who were willing to compromise with unionists if the terms were favourable 
to them. This newly elected assembly was to be a failure as both the SDLP and Sinn Fein 
refused to attend the few meetings which took place, with Sinn Fein reaffirming its 
commitment to not attend any parliaments which it saw as illegitimate and against the spirit 
of the Proclamation of the Irish Republic in 1916 which called for a 32 county Irish Republic.  
The next election that Sinn Fein contested was the British general election in 1983. The party 
ran 14 candidates in Northern Ireland at this election, which resulted in Gerry Adams 
becoming the first Sinn Fein MP since 1955 when he was elected in the Belfast West 
constituency. The party won 100,000 first preference votes in Northern Ireland, 13.7% of the 
overall vote and 43% of the nationalist vote in comparison to the SDLP, another sign of its 
growing popularity among the nationalist community in Northern Ireland (White, 1993, 
p.145). Later that year, Adams took over from Ruairi O’Bradaigh as President of Sinn Fein as 
O’Bradagih resigned, citing a lack of support in his leadership and his policies. This shift in 
power among the Sinn Fein leadership had been ongoing for a number of years, at the 1982 
Ard Fheis, the Eire Nua policy of a federal United Ireland which had been created by 
O’Bradaigh and the Sinn Fein leadership back in 1972, was removed from the Sinn Fein 
constitution at the behest of Gerry Adams, with the majority of delegates supporting Adams’ 
view rather than the view of the party leader. There had also been a change in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s whereby the nearly all of the main positions within the republican movement 
had been taken over by people from Northern Ireland rather than people from the Republic as 
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had previously been the case (White, 1993, p.145). The age profile of the new leadership with 
figures such as Adams and McGuinness was quite young with both men in their early to mid-
30s, with both men maintaining their positions as leaders of the republican movement for 
many years afterwards.  
With Adams taking over as party leader, there was a slow change in Sinn Fein’s stance 
towards their policy of abstentionism from parliaments which Sinn Fein still viewed as 
illegitimate. At the same Ard Fheis where Adams was elected party leader in 1983, a motion 
was passed where the ban on any discussion on a change of policy in relation to 
abstentionism was removed from the party constitution, although Adams stated that he would 
personally not advocate a change to the party’s abstentionist policy (Feeney, 2002, p.326). 
But by 1985, the party was voting on a motion to allow its members attend Dail Eireann (the 
Irish Parliament). This motion was only just defeated even though the leadership did not 
publicly support it, and was a sign of how the party’s political aspirations were slowly 
increasing under Adams’ leadership. The following years’ Ard Fheis was to be the scene for 
one of the most important moments in the party’s history, where the motion in favour of 
ending abstentionism to Dail Eireann was passed on this occasion. As was the common 
process at the time, the motion was first agreed by the IRA at its army convention, which was 
held very rarely due to the logistics of attempting to have many members of an illegal 
organisation in the same place at the same time. There were attempts to prevent a split in the 
organisation as had taken place in 1969-70 between the Provisional and Official factions of 
the IRA, and these were somewhat successful with around 75% of the IRA agreeing to end 
abstentionism to Dail Eireann, and the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis passing the motion with 429 votes 
for to 161 against (O’Brien, 1999, p.130). However, there was a walkout out led by former 
leader Ruairi O’Bradaigh and his supporters who went on to create Republican Sinn Fein, but 
this party received little attention compared to Sinn Fein due to their continued hard-line 
stance against using electoral politics and constitutional means to achieve their goal of a 
united Ireland. Although they decided to become more active in the political scene in the 
Republic, the decision to end abstentionism there did not mean there would be an end to the 
armed struggle in Northern Ireland in the near future, with Martin McGuinness stating in his 
speech at the 1986 Ard Fheis that the decision to enter the Irish parliament would not end 
Sinn Fein’s ‘unapologetic support for the right of Irish people to oppose in arms, the British 
forces of occupation’. In his speech, McGuinness also admitted that Sinn Fein was irrelevant 
as a political force to most people in the Republic, and that this would not change unless the 
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party changed its policy on abstentionism in order to attend Dail Eireann and that their enemy 
was Britain and not the Republic of Ireland (Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, 1986). This decision was a 
huge moment in the evolution of Sinn Fein from being just a mouthpiece for the IRA to being 
a strong electoral force throughout Ireland, although it would take a number of years before 
the party began to gain popularity, particularly in the Republic of Ireland.  
Going on the work of Panebianco, it could be said that Sinn Fein were/are a ‘highly 
institutionalised party which drastically limits its internal actors margins of maneuverability.’ 
(Panebianco, 1988, p.58). As the party was cloaked in secrecy and appeared to operate in a 
similar disciplinary fashion to its military wing the Provisional IRA, the party was run in a 
way where the members rigidly followed the instructions of the leadership, where views 
which strayed from the traditional dissident Irish republican outlook of refusing to recognise 
the Irish state founded as a result of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 and its institutions were 
seen as traitorous. From this perspective, it makes the achievement of the Adams and 
McGuinness leadership to persuade the majority of Sinn Fein members to recognise both  
Dail Eireann in 1986 and the main institutions in Northern Ireland such as the government 
and the police in the years after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, an incredible and 
almost unbelievable achievement considering the stance the republican movement previously 
took towards those institutions. 
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6 Decline in support for Sinn Fein and the IRA, The IRA ceasefire and The Belfast 
Agreement 
 
Despite Sinn Fein taking far more of an interest in electoral politics and with the change in 
their abstentionist policy in relation to attending the Irish parliament, the party began to 
encounter a downturn in its popularity in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In the Irish general 
election of February 1987, Sinn Fein did not win any seats, and won just 1.9% of first 
preference votes throughout the Republic. At the UK general election in June of the same 
year, party leader Gerry Adams managed to retain his seat, but the party’s vote decreased 
from just over 102,000 votes to around 83,000 votes, almost a 20% decrease in 4 years since 
the last election. This downward trend continued: in the 1989 Irish general election, the 
party’s vote decreased to just 20,000 first preference votes and just 1.2% of the vote. 
Throughout this period, the IRA were continuing the armed struggle against the British 
military presence in Northern Ireland as well as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (the 
police force of Northern Ireland) and many loyalist pro-British paramilitaries who were also 
determined to defeat the IRA. Despite becoming more active in electoral politics, Sinn Fein 
continued to have a hard-line stance against the British presence in Ireland compared to most 
other political parties, and because of this stance, most political leaders in Britain and Ireland 
refused to have any contact or association with them with the exception of SDLP leader John 
Hume, who was always in favour of having contact with Sinn Fein as a way of trying to solve 
the situation by peaceful means. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hume held 
secret talks with Sinn Fein, an early sign that Sinn Fein were willing to compromise and 
agree on a deal that could potentially end the conflict in Northern Ireland (Mitchell, 2013, 
p.224). But progress on these secret talks were very slow and in the meantime, there was little 
change in the situation in Northern Ireland, with IRA attacks continuing to be an almost daily 
occurrence throughout this time. 
Meanwhile, the electoral fortunes of Sinn Fein reached its lowest point since they began 
contesting elections in the early 1980s when its only MP, Gerry Adams, lost his seat to 
Westminster when he was defeated by the SDLP’s Joe Hendron in the Belfast West 
constituency. This result left Sinn Fein without any seats to the British parliament, and their 
support continuing to decrease, particularly in relation to the SDLP. At this stage, it was 
appearing that some sort of change in policy was needed by the republican movement in 
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order to revive their fortunes. With a continuing stalemate in the armed struggle against the 
British presence in Northern Ireland and no sign of any change in the situation, it was to be 
an increase in political activity and a decrease in military activity that would see a change in 
the fortunes of the republican movement in the 1990s, a change which in turn would lead to a 
pivotal peace agreement which would eventually bring peace and stability to Northern 
Ireland.  
Although there had been secret discussions between both sides as early as 1988, it was not 
until 1993 that there appeared to be a possibility that the negotiations between John Hume 
and Gerry Adams may lead to a cessation of violence and an IRA ceasefire (Lansford, 2014, 
p.1536). There was even an document produced jointly by Hume and Adams on a potential 
peace agreement, and although this paper were never published, it began the process whereby 
the republican movement were willing to compromise and end the armed campaign of the 
IRA in order to secure a peace agreement (Catterall, McDougall, 2016, pp.201-2). 
Simultaneously, negotiations were also taking place between the British and Irish 
governments which led to the Downing Street Declaration in December 1993, which stated 
that Northern Ireland would only ever become part of the Republic of Ireland if the majority 
of people in both jurisdictions were in favour of it, and that the people of both jurisdictions in 
Ireland had the right to solve issues in the Republic and Northern Ireland by mutual consent. 
Even more importantly, the declaration stated that all sides in the conflict, even those 
involved with paramilitary organisations such as Sinn Fein, would be allowed in peace talks 
as long as they gave up using violence as a means of achieving their goals (Cox, Guelke, 
Stephen, 2006, pp.486-88). It was arguably this declaration which was one of the prime 
reasons for the first major IRA ceasefire in August 1994, when the IRA declared their 
intention to enhance the democratic process and show their definitive commitment to a peace 
process by halting armed activity. In their statement announcing their ceasefire, the IRA said 
that they believed that there was now an opportunity for a just and lasting peace settlement to 
be created, and that they wanted to be a part of any inclusive negotiations which would lead 
to a solution and end to the conflict in Northern Ireland (BBC, 31 August 1994). External 
environment change in Sinn Fein 
It is clear there had also been a change in the external environment outside of Sinn Fein and 
the IRA, particularly after Margaret Thatcher’s time in power. Despite her hard-line strategy 
against the IRA throughout the 1980’s in an attempt to destroy the organisation altogether 
which had without doubt weakened it, the IRA was still functioning and operating quite 
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effectively and the conflict in Northern Ireland still very active. But with the new British 
Prime Minister and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds along with SDLP leader John Hume 
being more inclined to bring Sinn Fein into peace talks and stop the violence through talks 
and negotiations, this ‘changing environment’ as Panebianco would call it, brought Sinn Fein 
into the fold and gave the republican movement a chance to try and win some of its demands 
through peaceful means and compromising with those who they had opposed for many years  
(Panebianco, 1988, p.49). The rigidity to the traditional Irish republican ideology which had 
formerly been in place during the Ruairi O’Bradaigh had been replaced with a certain amount 
of flexibility under the Gerry Adams leadership, and despite many within the republican 
movement still holding non-compromising views on their Irish republican political ideology, 
the movement slowly undertook the path to dropping their weapons and ending their violent 
campaign throughout the 1990s in what was known as TUAS (Tactical Use of Armed 
Struggle) (Moloney, 2002, p.432). This change was brought about not only by the leadership 
of the republican movement, but also due to the change of external environment outside of 
the republican movement in the early 1990s.  
The IRA ceasefire which began in August 1994 led to a relatively peaceful period in 
Northern Ireland for approximately 18 months. But after Sinn Fein were not being allowed 
into negotiations with other political parties from Northern Ireland to find a political solution 
which could lead to a power-sharing agreement, the IRA ended their ceasefire in February 
1996 with a large bombing in central London which they gave prior warning about just 
before the explosion occurred killing 2 people. In their statement declaring the end of their 
ceasefire, the IRA accused British prime minister John Major and unionist leaders for 
‘squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict’ that ‘selfish party and 
political interests in London were placed before the rights of the people of Ireland and that 
the failure so far of the Irish peace process lay with John Major and his government’ (CAIN, 
February 9 1996).  It was arguably this bombing and the end of the IRA ceasefire which led 
Major to announce only a few weeks later that Sinn Fein would be allowed into all-party 
talks, as well as dropping his previous demand that the IRA must end their armed campaign 
before being allowed to attend any negotiations, with some seeing this as evidence that the 
IRA were able to use violence as a way of getting Sinn Fein into the negotiations and giving 
them a stronger role in the peace process (Oppenheimer, 2008, p.38). But when the time 
came for the all-party negotiations to take place in June 1996, Sinn Fein were still refused to 
enter the negotiations, and just days later, the IRA detonated another bomb in Manchester 
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city centre causing hundreds of millions of pounds in damages caused by the explosion 
although incredibly no one was killed due to the IRA giving prior warning of the explosion. 
Sporadic violence against British forces in Northern Ireland and other bomb threats took 
place in late 1996 and early 1997, but a possible peaceful settlement to the conflict looked 
closer than ever before with the election of Tony Blair as British prime minister in a landslide 
victory for the Labour Party in the British general election in May 1997. Unlike his 
predecessor John Major, Blair did not rely in unionist votes from Northern Ireland to remain 
in power, which enabled Blair to pursue a peace settlement which would involve Sinn Fein 
even if many hard-line unionists such as the Democratic Unionist Party were against Sinn 
Fein having any involvement. This new outlook from the Blair administration resulted in 
another IRA ceasefire on July 20 1997, and this time the ceasefire was to be permanent. In 
September of the same year, Sinn Fein agreed to the Mitchell Principles in order to be 
allowed to involved in the main negotiations towards a peaceful settlement. These principles 
declared that each party involved in the negotiations had to agree to only use peaceful means 
to resolve any political issues, to the total disarmament of paramilitary organisations, to 
renounce the use of violence as a way of trying to influence the course of the negotiations, 
and to agree to abide by the terms of any peace agreement and that any terms they disagreed 
with that they would only try and alter them through peaceful methods (Knox, Quirk, 2000, 
p.39). However, there were a small minority within the republican movement who disagreed 
with Sinn Fein agreeing to these principles, and would have seen this pledge to keep to the 
Mitchell principles as a betrayal of the principles of Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA. Some 
of these went on to form the Real IRA as a breakaway paramilitary group, an organisation 
which would cause the Omagh bombing in August 1998, one of the biggest atrocities of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland with the deaths of 29 people. Because of their small membership 
as well as the negative publicity surrounding the Omagh bombing, the Real IRA never 
became a major force and although they still exist, they never threatened the prominence of 
the Provisional IRA as the military wing of the republican movement.  
By September 1997, the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland had resumed once again with 
Sinn Fein being involved on this occasion. These talks lasted for a number of months, and 
there were many turbulent periods such as when Sinn Fein were excluded for a few weeks as 
a result of alleged IRA involvement in two killings in Belfast in February 1998. By March 
25, the chairman of the negotiations US Senator George Mitchell, set a deadline of April 9 for 
an agreement to be reached between all parties involved in the negotiations. This deadline 
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was not met by April but at this point it was very close to an agreement being reached, so the 
deadline was extended once again. On the evening of April 10, Senator Mitchell announced 
that an agreement had been reached which would later become known as the Good Friday 
Agreement. The agreement contained proposals for a Northern Ireland Assembly which 
would involve a power-sharing arrangement between unionists and nationalists, cross-border 
institutions between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland such as the Council of 
Ireland, the dropping of the Republic of Ireland’s constitutional claim to Northern Ireland and 
proposals to decommission paramilitary weapons, the policing of Northern Ireland and the 
early release of paramilitary prisoners (BBC, 2018). All of the major political parties in 
Northern Ireland with the exception of the Democratic Unionist Party agreed to the Belfast 
Agreement along with both the British and Irish governments, and it marked the most 
important event at that time towards a lasting peace and end to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland.  
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7 End of the IRA’s armed struggle and beginning of the power-sharing government in 
Northern Ireland 
 
The signing of the Belfast Agreement led to a referendum in both Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland on the agreement in order for it to become law. These referendums took 
place on May 22 1998, with the Republic voting to amend the Irish constitution to facilitate 
the Irish government giving up their territorial claim to Northern Ireland which had been 
enshrined in the 1937 Irish constitution and to comply with the Belfast Agreement and to 
recognise that a united Ireland would only take place with the approval of the majority of 
people in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The referendum in the Republic 
was easily passed with 94% voting in favour of the changes to the constitution. There was a 
belief that it may not be passed so easily in Northern Ireland due to the opposition of the DUP 
and even some prominent individuals in the UUP to the agreement, however, the agreement 
was passed in Northern Ireland with 71% voting Yes with a very high overall turnout of 81% 
of the electorate.  
But despite this momentous event and the support given to it by the electorate in both the 
Repulbic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, it would take a number of years for the institutions 
envisaged in the Good Friday Agreement to be properly implemented due to a number of 
issues such as the IRA’s lack of urgency in decommissioning their weapons, instability and 
dissent within the Ulster Unionist Party along with the continuing lack of trust between 
unionists and nationalists and decline in popularity of the nationalist SDLP and the Ulster 
Unionist Party and the rise to popularity of Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party in 
the early and mid 2000s. The agreement came into force officially on December 2 1999, but 
the concept of power-sharing between unionists and nationalists at the Stormont Assembly 
struggled to become a reality for a number of years. The full implementation of the 
agreement was initially halted due to the slow pace of IRA decommissioning which 
eventually began in mid-2000. After this, progress was still very slow and it was halted 
altogether due to the Stormontgate scandal in 2002 when leading Sinn Fein members such as 
Denis Donaldson were arrested and alleged with gathering secret intelligence for the IRA. A 
number of days after, the devolved government in Northern Ireland collapsed, and the 
assembly was suspended for over 4 and a half years before resuming. The collapse and 
suspension of the assembly led to stalemate situation for a number of years afterwards, with 
very little being done in the way of ending the stalemate. However during this period, a 
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number of crucial events took place which once again changed the landscape of politics in 
Northern Ireland. It began with the 2003 election to the still suspended Northern Ireland 
assembly, where a huge change in previous voting patterns took place with the staunchly pro-
British DUP and Sinn Fein encountering large increases in popularity for each other, at the 
expense of the moderate unionist and nationalist parties, the UUP and the SDLP. This would 
mean that any future government in Northern Ireland would have to include the DUP and 
Sinn Fein working together, something which seemed unlikely at this time considering the 
completely different stances that each party had on almost every political issue imaginable. 
The fact that the DUP did not sign up to the Good Friday Agreement was also going to be a 
problem, and their uncompromising stance towards Sinn Fein and the IRA still not 
decommissioning their weapons would also lead to a further delay in any progress towards 
a power sharing government in Northern Ireland. Negotiations between both sides in 2004 
failed to end the stalemate, but progress in relation to power sharing appeared to have taken 
place with Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern believing that progress had been made on many 
issues and DUP leader Ian Paisley declaring that they had ‘never been closer to solving the 
problems which have plagued us for decades’ (BBC, 18 September 2004).  
This ongoing process led to one of the most important events in the history of Sinn Fein, if 
not even the history of Ireland in 2005, when the IRA decided to permanently end their 
armed campaign against British rule in Ireland. On July 28 of that year, they ordered all IRA 
units and volunteers to dump arms, and to ‘develop political and democratic programmes 
through exclusively peaceful means’ after ‘unprecedented internal discussion and 
consultation process among IRA units and volunteers’. They also stated that there was now 
an alternative way of achieving a united Ireland and ending British rule in Ireland without 
using violence, but at the same time they continued to defend the armed struggle they had 
undertaken since 1969 which they still saw as being entirely legitimate. They also recognised 
the difficulties in the ongoing peace process (the Northern Ireland Executive having being 
suspended since 2002), something which the IRA blamed on the all other sides in the conflict 
except themselves, stating that the British and Irish governments along with unionists in 
Northern Ireland were not doing enough to engage in the peace process (The Guardian, July 
28, 2005). The decision to end the armed campaign for good was taken  
By finally ending their armed campaign and giving in to what all other sides in the conflict 
had been wanting for years , Sinn Fein were putting themselves in a position where they 
could now be accepted as a legitimate political party who would not try and shoot and bomb 
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their way into getting what they wanted as they may have done before , and with Sinn Fein 
also becoming the most popular nationalist party in Northern Ireland, it would result in 
unionists and the British and Irish governments being put into a position where they had to 
give Sinn Fein a large role in Northern Irish politics once they denounced using violence to 
achieve their goals.   
But despite the progress being made in the aftermath of the end of the IRA’s armed struggle, 
there were still a number of controversial incidents to take place. In December 2005, criminal 
charges were dropped against prominent Sinn Fein member Denis Donaldson for allegedly 
being part of an IRA spy ring in Stormont, but just days after this, it was revealed that 
Donaldson was in a fact an agent and informer for the British intelligence, a huge shock and 
revelation to all those involved in the conflict who would never have guessed that such a 
prominent republican such as Donaldson would be informing British intelligence on Irish 
republican activities (BBC News, December 16 2005). Normally, the punishment for 
informers like Donaldson would be death, but as the IRA had ended their armed campaign, 
Donaldson was told that he would not be harmed and that he was safe to return to Belfast 
after leaving home due to fear of retribution from republicans who would have felt betrayed 
by Donaldson being a British agent. But in April 2006, Donaldson was found shot dead in the 
Republic of Ireland, and although another splinter group the Real IRA took responsibility for 
his murder, many still believe that it was the Provisional IRA who committed the murder, 
with an anonymous Sinn Fein member who was also acting as a British agent stating his view 
in a recent documentary that he was told by a Provisional IRA member that it was they had 
committed the murder, and that for it to have taken place, it must have been sanctioned by 
Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams (BBC Northern Ireland Spotlight, 20 September 2016). 
Adams described the claims as ‘nonsense’ and has threatened to take action against the BBC 
for the claims made against him in the programme (The Irish News, 29 September 2016). But 
the revealing of Donaldson to be a British agent and his subsequent murder only a few 
months later was not of any help to the peace process in Northern Ireland, which by this point 
was at a very important juncture which would ensure whether or not it could be properly 
implemented the way it was supposed to function according to the Good Friday Agreement. 
By the end of September 2005, the IRA had destroyed and decommissioned its weapons 
under the supervision of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning 
(BBC, September 26 2005). What was now left for the peace process to become fully 
functioning was for the unionist side and on particularly the Democratic Unionist Party to 
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agree to go into a power-sharing government with Sinn Fein to ensure the political stability of 
Northern Ireland, along with Sinn Fein having to recognise and support the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI) as being the legitimate police force of Northern Ireland, a sharp 
contrast to how Sinn Fein and the IRA had formerly seen the PSNI and particularly its 
predecessor, the RUC.  The pivotal moment in this was to be multi-party talks held in St 
Andrews, Scotland in October 2006, which led to the signing of the St Andrews Agreement 
between both the British and Irish governments and crucially, Sinn Fein, the DUP and every 
other major political party in Northern Ireland. This agreement was slightly different to the 
Good Friday Agreement in that it included the DUP on this occasion (they had refused to sign 
the Good Friday Agreement) ,it included the devolution of Northern Ireland’s policing from 
London to Belfast with Sinn Fein’s pledge to support the PSNI, and most importantly of all, 
it paved the way for Northern Ireland to be ruled from Belfast rather than London, with the 
envisaged new government being a power-sharing one between unionists and nationalists 
(OECD, 2016, p.56).  
After elections to the Northern Ireland assembly in March 2007 which resulted in the DUP 
and Sinn Fein having the highest and second highest number of seats, a deadline was set for 
March 26 by which the DUP and Sinn Fein had to nominate ministerial positions in the new 
executive. This deadline was not met and Sinn Fein and the DUP did not even have face to 
face talks for the first time until the day of the deadline itself. The deadline was not met, but 
both sides pledged that they would form a government by May 8, a deadline which was met 
on this occasion. So on May 8, an event which would have seemed unthinkable during the 
Troubles, not only the momentous occasion of a power-sharing government in Northern 
Ireland between unionists and republicans, but an executive with the firebrand loyalist Ian 
Paisley as First Minister and former IRA member Martin McGuinness as Deputy First 
Minister, two men who previously had been political enemies with completely different 
political and social views. It was even more incredible considering that the two men had 
never even spoken to each other until 6 weeks previously, and then on the day of the 
Northern Assembly being re-opened, they were pictured laughing and joking with each other, 
something which no one would probably have ever predicted to occur between two people 
who had most likely hated each other until a few weeks previously. The iconic image of 
Paisley and McGuinness laughing and joking with each other that day was evidence of how 
far the peace process in Northern Ireland had progressed, with the future looking more 
positive than it had ever been.  
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It also represented the huge shift in direction by Sinn Fein in the previous 25 years, 
something which had begun with the election of Bobby Sands to the British parliament back 
in 1981. Since then, they slowly moved their way into electoral politics in Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland, and despite a lack of support for them after an impressive start 
due to the publicity surrounding the 1981 Maze Prison hunger strike, they began to gain a lot 
of popularity after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, an agreement which they 
played a pivotal part in designing and then implementing in the following years. Along with 
the slowing down and eventual end of their armed campaign, they have gained popularity 
among voters in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, particularly in the 
Republic due to their opposition to many of the unpopular austerity policies implemented by 
the Irish government in the last number of years. It could also mean that Sinn Fein may be in 
government on both sides of the border in the not so distant future, something which may 
have seemed unthinkable for an organisation which 40 years ago, did not contest elections 
and wholeheartedly supported using violence to gain power in Ireland.  
There is no doubt that the current power-sharing agreement in place in Northern Ireland 
would not have occurred had it not been for the republican movement’s change in methods 
from using violence to using electoral politics to increase support for their cause. By ending 
their armed campaign, they gained support from voters who would not have previously 
considered voting for Sinn Fein due to their connection with the IRA and their use of force, 
and by declaring their intent for a compromise from their previous stance and wanting a 
peaceful solution to the political problems in Northern Ireland, they forced the Ulster 
Unionist Party and eventually the Democratic Unionist Party into also compromising with 
them and working together in order to end the violence and improve the lives of the people of 
Northern Ireland. At the same time, Sinn Fein managed to keep the majority of their party’s 
supporters on their side whilst changing their tactics from supporting the IRA’s use of 
violence against the British presence in Northern Ireland and trying to get the United 
Kingdom to withdraw from Northern Ireland, to accepting the British presence there and to 
try and achieve a united Ireland through constitutional means and without the use of violence 
like they had previously supported. It was an incredible achievement by the leadership of 
Sinn Fein over a 20 year period to do this, although they were probably assisted by the 
stalemate at which the Troubles had reached by the late 1980s and early 1990s when it was 
obvious the IRA would not be successful in ending British rule in Northern Ireland using 
force, and by this stage, most republicans were realistic enough to know that any chance of a 
 49 
 
united Ireland ever taking place would only occur if the majority of people in Northern 
Ireland supported it, something which Sinn Fein accepted as part of the Good Friday 
Agreement.  
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8 Conclusion 
By changing their methods to achieve their goals, Sinn Fein have gone from being a fringe 
political party to being one of the most popular parties in Ireland in the space of 30 years. 
This came about mainly due to the leadership of Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams and his 
comrade Martin McGuinness who played equally as important a role in persuading the IRA 
and the republican movement in changing their methods. As of 2018, they are the third 
biggest party in the Republic of Ireland parliament and they are the second largest party in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, and they also have many young and energetic politicians coming 
through their ranks to take over from some of the older generation, (many of whom were 
involved with the IRA) while the younger Sinn Fein politicians do not have any connection 
with the IRA or any terrorist activities, which may make it easier for the ordinary voter in 
Ireland to support the younger generation of Sinn Fein politicians than the older ones who 
had a history of involvement with the IRA. They may have achieved their main goal of a 
united Ireland, but with the changing political landscape in Northern Ireland due to Brexit 
and the possible implications of it, and their rise in support in the Republic of Ireland in 
recent years, Sinn Fein are far nearer to achieving their goals than ever before and may yet 
achieve their main political goals in the near future without having to resort to violence and 
through using electoral politics and peaceful means. 
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9 Povzetek 
Razvoj in preoblikovanje organizacije Sinn Fein iz zelo majhne, celo obrobne politične 
stranke ter  političnega glasnika IRA v eno od najmočnejših in popularnih političnih strank na 
Irskem, ki je prenehala uporabljati nasilna sredstva za dosego svojih ciljev, je posledica vrste 
dogodkov, ki so se zgodili v  dobrih  25 letih. Pred dobrimi 25 leti je Irsko republikansko 
gibanje ponovno nastopilo na volitvah, in sicer je bil leta 1981 na nadomestnih volitvah v 
britanski parlament uspešen vodja gladovne stavke IRA Bobby Sands.  Od takrat je Sinn Fein 
počasi, a zagotovo povečevala svoje aktivnosti ter poskušala postati pomembna politična sila 
na Severnem Irskem in tudi v Republiki Irski. Sprva je s kampanjo Anti H-Block ta 
organizacija  uporabljala taktiko oboroženega boja  organizacije IRA proti britanski vladi na 
Severnem Irskem in gladovno stavko irskih republikancev kot mehanizem pridobitve volilne 
podpore, taktiko, ki je bila očitno uspešna v celotnem letu 1981 ter je vodila k veliki 
publiciteti ne le na Irskem in v Združenem kraljestvu, temveč širše po svetu. 
Po uspehih gibanja in kampanje Anti H-Block na volitvah na Severnem Irskem in v 
Republiki Irski leta 1981 se je organizacija Sinn Fein odločila, da v naslednjih letih na 
volitvah formalno nastopi s svojimi  kandidati.  Še naprej je ta organizacija bila relativno 
uspešna , pri čemer je bil leta 1983 tudi njen prihodnji vodja Gerry Adams izvoljen v 
britanski parlament.  Kasneje tega leta je  Adams postal vodja stranke in stranka se je 
odločila, da  bo poskušala še povečevati svojo volilno podporo, hkrati pa je popolnoma 
podpirala tudi organizacijo IRA v njenem oboroženem boju proti britanski  vladavini  na 
Severnem Irskem. V Sinn Fein so potem sprejeli številne pomembne odločitve, ki naj bi 
spremenile poti doseganja zastavljenih političnih ciljev. Tako so se leta 1986 odločili, da 
bodo zasedli izvoljene stolčke v parlamentu Republike Irske, če bi bili vanj njihovi 
predstavniki izvoljeni. To je  zelo pomemben trenutek in odločitev, saj je Sinn Fein s tem 
priznala irski parlament kot legitimno oblast Irske, nekaj kar je Sinn Fein pred več kot 60 leti 
odločno zavrnila. Ta odločitev je  povzročila razkol v stranki , vendar je večina v njej ostala 
zvesta Adamsu in njegovemu vodstvu.  
Po zgodnjih uspehih, ki so sledili tragičnim dogodkom v času gladovne stavke, in pridobitvi 
svetovne publicitete zaradi delovanja organizacije IRA, je organizacija Sinn Fein v naslednjih 
letih le počasi povečevala svojo volilno podporo izven  njene tradicionalne volilne baze. 
Temu je bilo tako verjetno predvsem zaradi nadaljevanja nasilne kampanje IRA, ki je 
povzročila  veliko nepotrebnih smrti. Šele ko je IRA začela zagovarjati  mirno rešitev 
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konflikta, se je začela spreminjati tudi volilna podpora Sinn Feinu. Ta je narastla zlasti 
potem, ko je Sinn Fein odigrala pomembno vlogo v končnih pogajanjih o  Belfastskem 
sporazumu leta 1998. Takrat je Sinn Fein postala tudi najbolj priljubljena Irska 
nacionalistična / republikanska  stranka na Severnem Irskem. 
Končna ustavitev nasilnega delovanja organizacije IRA leta 1997 je Sinn Fein omogočila, da 
odigra ključno vlogo pri pogajanjih o delitvi oblasti  na Severnem Irskem. Tako delovanje, v 
katero je bila Sinn Fein vključena in ga je tudi podpirala, predstavlja velik preobrat, saj je le 
nekaj let pred tem ta stranka izrazito nasprotovala vsem političnim institucijam na Severnem 
Irskem.  Leta 2005 so svojo oboroženo delovanje  dokončno zaključili  in od leta  leta 2007 si 
je stranka Sinn Fein delila oblast  v koaliciji s svojimi nekdanjimi sovražniki, z močno pro-
britansko demokratsko unijo. Na tej točki so se v Sinn Feinu popolnoma odpovedali uporabi 
nasilnih metod in poti za dosego zastavljenih političnih ciljev ter se zavezali k uporabi le 
miroljubnih in pravnih sredstev za dosego teh ciljev. Danes je Sinn Fein ena najbolj 
priljubljenih političnih strank, tako na Severnem Irskem kot v Republiki Irski, ki ji 
priljubljenost tudi še naprej narašča, tako da je verjento le vprašanje časa, kdaj bo stranka 
postala del oblasti v obeh delih Irske. 
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